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1. Introduction.  
It is in the notes on Americanism and Fordism in Notebook 22 that 
Antonio Gramsci gives rise to a new topology of the systemic 
categories of his thought, comparing the new forms of American 
capitalism with the economic and social organization of the old 
European continent. And it is precisely from this reconfiguration 
and rearrangement of the organic concepts of his thinking, with ref-
erence to the new forms of production and technology summarized 
in the term “Fordism”, that it is worth starting out as an introduction 
and guide to this essay which attempts to try and reflect on the new 
digital technologies and the new “humanity and spirituality” that 
derive from them. Americanism in Gramsci’s pages essentially 
refers, as is well known, to the technological and social revolution 
of Fordism, based on the one hand on mass production through 
assembly lines and a Taylorist division of labour and, on the other, 
on the increase in wages and consequent consumption. But above 
all it refers, to move from this radical transformation of the pro-
ductive structure, to a sort of totalization of capital, in the sense of 
an economic structure that produces not only material goods and 
class relations, but also worldviews, values, ideologies through which 
human beings live their social life. In an America not burdened by 
great historical and cultural traditions as in Europe,  
 
it was relatively easy to rationalise production and labour by a skilful 
combination of force (destruction of working-class trade unionism on a 
territorial basis) and persuasion (high wages, various social benefits, extremely 
subtle ideological and political propaganda) and thus succeed in making the 
whole life of the nation revolve around production. Hegemony here is born in 
the factory and requires for its exercise only a minute quantity of professional 
political and ideological intermediaries. The phenomenon of the “masses” 
which so struck Romier
 
is nothing but the form taken by this “rationalised” 
society in which the “structure” dominates the superstructures more 
immediately and in which the latter are also “rationalised” (simplified and 
reduced in number) (Q22§2,pp. 2145-6; SPN pp. 285-6).1 
 
1 A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell- 
Smith, Lawrence and Wishart, London 1971, pp. 285-6. The volume is available on the 




It is superfluous to remember how much in the tradition of 
theoretical Marxism Gramsci dislocated the concept of ideology 
from the only negative connotation of false consciousness to its 
gnoseological, cognitive valorization: in the sense of interpreting 
the world of ideas, worldviews, ethical and moral values, as an 
indispensable medium, we could say Kantianly as a “transcend-
ental”, to perceive, move and give meaning to reality. So much so 
as to define, the Sardinian thinker, for this epistemological, and at 
the same time ethical-political function, assigned to ideologies, with 
the term civil society much less the complex of economic relations 
and practices, as had happened in the Marxian lexicon, and much 
more that sphere of political activity par excellence, as a place 
where so-called private organizations (trade unions, parties, 
organizations of all kinds) appear on the scene, which have as their 
objective the production and confirmation of the consent or, on 
the contrary, the transformation of people's ways of thinking. But, 
without going into the very complex question, here what is 
important to underline is that Gramsci, with this definition of 
Americanism-Fordism as a social-historical field in which the 
economic structure directly produces the ways and values of 
generalized social conscience, has made his own - without being 
sufficiently aware of them either philological or philosophical - the 
lesson of the Marx of Capital, for which, with the doctrine of 
fetishism, the ideological production of ideas is produced by the 
same economic relations of exchange, without the need for social 
actors specifically and professionally dedicated to cultural activities. 
In other words, that lesson of Marxian fetishism that tells us that 
the place of genesis and configuration of the ideological is not in the 
superstructure, as the German Ideology and the Introduction of ’59 wanted, 
but directly, and paradoxically, in the structure.  
I leave it to the reader to reflect on the epochal scope, in my 
opinion, of this different location of the foundation of ideology, 
according to which the production of capital and, at the same time, 
the production of its self-dissimilation are intrinsically linked, 
specifically when capitalism reaches the most advanced 
technological transformations that are most appropriate to its 
nature. But what is more significant in my view is that this intrinsic 
 
Internet with this page numbering; an alternative electronic version also exists, published by 
ElecBooks (London), 1999, but with a different page numbering. 




connection, originally conceived by Gramsci, between economic 
structure and ideology appears to be the most consonant introduction 
to the content of the reflections that follow in this essay. 
 
2. The “German Technology”. 
In order, from a Marxist perspective, to carry out certain critical 
considerations on new information technologies today I think it is 
necessary to reflect briefly on the different meanings of the terms 
“Technique” and “Technology”, with particular reference to the 
history of the meaning of the word “Technology” (Technologie) in 
German. The main hypothesis that I intend to present is in fact that 
the German meaning of “Technologie”, which Marx uses above all 
in Capital and in the 1863-65 Manuscripts, is profoundly different 
from the meaning of the English terms Technology and Technique.2 
The semantic context of the term Technologie in the context of late 
eighteenth-century German culture appears marked by deeply 
original characteristics. German Technologie is an academic discipline 
that was born and developed as a science of administration and 
politics in the German principalities. Technologie was taught in 
German Universities and was part of the curriculum of the state 
officials, civil servants, who had the function of managing the 
growth of material wealth and production activity. Technology was a 
science whose scope was to give state officials a precise knowledge of 
craft and manufacturing activities, their classification, articulation 
and distinction based on the different types of products, their best 
location, procurement and transport network, their relationship 
with agriculture and with other social and administrative areas of 
the cameral (“chamber”) and police sciences. As the long title of 
Johann Beckmann’s Anleitung zur Technologie says, “Technologie” 
had its field of study in “knowledge of crafts, factories and 
manufactures, above all those which are in closer connection with 
 
2 The indispensable reference on all this is to the research work that Guido Frison has been 
carrying out for many years now, and from whose writings I personally have drawn the 
fundamental indications for the study of cameralism in German culture and society and, at the 
same time, for the deepening of the semantic and conceptual distinction between the German 
entries “Technologie” and “Technik”. Of Frison’s considerable production, suffice it to 
mention here G. Frison: Linnaeus, Beckmann, Marx and the foundation of technology. Between natural 
and social sciences: a hypothesis of an ideal type. First Part: Linnaeus and Beckmann, Cameralism, 
Oeconomia and technologie, in “History and technology”, 1993, vol. 10, pp. 139-160; Second and 
Third Parts, Beckmann, Marx, technology and classical economics, in “History and technology”, 1993, 
vol. 10, pp. 161-173. By the same author see also Technical and technological innovation in Marx, in 
“History and technology”, 1988, vol. 6, pp. 299-324. 




agriculture [Landwirtschaft], police [Polizey] and cameral science”, 
where Polizey meant, approximately, government administration.  
The aim of Technologie was to increase the wealth of the State and, 
as such, it had as its object of knowledge much more the 
classification and definition of the procedures and phases of a 
production activity – starting from the nature and specific type of 
the object of work – than the study of machinery and work tools. 
One of its fundamental purposes was to subtract artisan know-how 
from a purely empirical and practical competence and to translate it 
into a precise path, into a method of rigorous knowledge, which 
was not used by the craftsman but by the state bureaucrat.  
   
It [Technologie] must not train any weaver, any beer-maker, nor in general any 
craftsman (Handwerker) because to practise their art they need great ability and 
dexterity which [both] have to be acquired separately through boring exercise, 
but are useless abilities for those to whom I am referring (Beckmann, Anleitung 
zur Technologie, Vorrede, 2nd ed. 1780).  
 
In handicraft workshops knowledge was only of a customary 
nature, according to the instructions of the master craftsman to 
companions and apprentices. Instead Technologie ordered work 
operations in a rigorous and systematic way, according to the view 
of a social actor, who, external to the production process, was able 
to direct a production that was not only efficient in itself but 
coherent with the entire territory of the Prince and of the state, as 
well as with the well-being of the whole population.  
 
Technology is the science which teaches how to treat (Verarbeitung) natural 
objects (Naturalien) or the knowledge of crafts (Gewerbe). Instead in the 
workshops, it is only shown [that] one must follow the instructions and the 
habits of the master in order to produce the commodity, [on the contrary] 
technology provides in systematic order fundamental introduction[s] in finding 
the means to reach this final goal on the basis of true principles and reliable 
experiences, and how to explain and to utilize the phenomena which take place 
during the treatment (J. Beckmann, Anleitung zur Technologie, 2nd ed., 1780: 17).  
 
Due to its exteriority to the production processes understood in 
the strict sense, Technologie therefore showed a dual nature. On the 
one hand, in fact, it was a political-administrative discipline, which 
participated in state power, in state authority, and on the other it 
was a scientific discipline because, similarly to the natural sciences, it 




objectively described the necessary way of being and of carrying out 
production processes. Both these characteristics came together in 
the same goal: to separate the knowledge of doing from the doing in the 
context of economic activities and to differentiate learned and 
skilful men (the cameralistic bureaucrats as much as the business-
men) according to a hierarchical relationship of competences or 
expertise from the executors of manufacture and crafts. 
  Johann Beckmann studied the methods of working the mines, 
factories and foundries as well as the collections of art and natural 
history, during his travels in Holland, Denmark and Sweden. 
Inspired by the taxonomic work of the botanic scholar Linnaeus, he 
taught “Philosophie und Technologie” at the University of 
Göttingen, which had been since its foundation one of Germany's 
best universities open to the modern culture of the Enlightenment. 
There he lectured on political and domestic economy, and in 1768 
created a botanical garden according to Linnaean principles. 
Among the many works by Beckmann, those most significant for 
our topic are the Anleitung zur Technologie (1777) and the Beiträge zur 
Geschichte der Erfindungen (1780–1805). 
What is important to consider is that his activity as a scholar of 
manufacturing, craft techniques, mining and his teaching of 
Technology (Technologie) as a university discipline, falls into the socio-
political and administrative context of the era of so-called 
Cameralism. 
Cameralism (from the German Kammer, the prince’s treasure chamber 
first, and after the prince’s council chamber,) characterized the political 
and administrative theory and practice of the German principalities 
during the eighteenth century and continued to influence German 
state theory, especially Prussia, even during the nineteenth century. 
The conception of the state in the cameralistic tradition was profoundly 
different from the tradition of English liberalism. In the latter, the public 
authority must essentially guarantee order, so that everyone can act 
freely with his own private initiative, provided that it does not harm 
the private sphere of the others. On the contrary, in the German 
tradition, where the prince was also the father of his subjects, the 
state had to guarantee people not only order but also happiness and 
wellbeing. In this context, Technologie was a university discipline 
aimed at increasing the wealth of the state and constituted the 
competence, the knowledge of the cameralistic bureaucrat as regards 




his ability to direct a production process, in which the workers had 
to follow the prescriptions of the competent scientist. 
Moreover, understanding the function of Technologie as a 
university discipline for the formation of the bureaucracy of the 
German Principalities implies underlining the different vision of the 
economy that distinguished the British culture and the German 
culture of the second half of the 1700s. In the former, the economy 
was increasingly a political economy, that is, a science that had the 
market as its fundamental object as a place of socialization and 
comparison between free economic players. It is a political economy 
because it considers the market as the characteristic institution 
through which modern civil society lives and reproduces itself, as a 
social sphere distinguished from the political state. In the modern 
market, the formation of prices is impersonal, each person’s action 
not depending on anyone in particular, since it depends on 
everyone’s economic action. For this reason, in English political 
economy, the nature of economic law has a different character from 
the nature of political law, based on decision and choice. Instead, in 
the German culture of the late eighteenth century, economics still 
has a profound link with the classical-Aristotelian meaning of 
economy as oikos-nomos (administration of the house). 
According to an ancient conception by which the patrimony of 
the sovereign is not yet distinct from the patrimony of the state, the 
Prince in the German principality was not only sovereign but also, 
as said, father of his subjects. As a father (as head of the oikos) he 
had the obligation and the honour to guarantee not only order but 
also the well-being of his subjects-children. In this sense Technologie 
was part of the more general Polizey, as having care of the whole of 
the polis, that is, as management and functioning of the State with 
particular reference to the well-being of the population. Nor was it 
by chance that the two university chairs that were established in 
1727 at the Universities of Halle and Frankfurt an der Oder are 
chairs of Ökonomische-, Polizey- und Kameralwissenschaft. That is to say, 
the cameralists were not so much economists, in the most modern 
sense of the term, as primarily bureaucrats and political scientists, in 
the historical context of the extraordinary reforming push produced 
by so-called “enlightened absolutism” on the basis of the political 
effects of Protestantism. 




Johann Beckmann’s Anleitung zur Technologie (1777) was the first 
work that self-consciously developed the concept of technology as 
a discipline devoted to the systematic description of handicrafts and 
industrial arts. Beckmann sought to make Technologie into a true 
knowledge (Wissenschaft) by creating a classificatory scheme 
equivalent to the Linnaean system for plants and animals.  
From this point of view Beckmann tried to develop through the 
whole work of his life a number of overall classification frameworks 
that could contain the entire complex of the manufacturing and 
production processes of goods. From the raw materials and the 
natural resources of agriculture handled in his Principles of German 
Agriculture [Grundsätze der teutschen Landwirtschaft, 1769], through the 
description of the different productive branches and its correspond-
ing innovation process in his Guide to Technology [Anleitung zur 
Technologie, 1777], to the classification in material-physical sense of 
final goods in his Introduction to the Commodity Sciences [Vorbereitung zur 
Waarenkunde, 1795-1800] and, finally, to the Guide to Science of Trade 
[Anleitung zur Handelswissenschaft, 1789]. 
Nevertheless it can be emphasized that the most general 
characteristic of cameralist culture was grounded in a natural-
historical approach to knowledge and as such, focused on 
classifying rather than explaining. Beckmann’s Technologie rested 
indeed firmly in the tradition of Bacon’s proposal for a natural 
history of trades, a project also pursued in Denis Diderot and Jean 
D’Alembert’s contemporary project of the Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire 
raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers. However, this scientific 
tradition was included in the education processes belonging to 
cameralism, as a set of practically-oriented academic disciplines 
concerned with state administrative organization.  
In this historical and social context, the meaning of Technologie in 
the German language of the eighteenth century combined in an 
inextricable way a meaning that belonged to the natural sciences and a 
meaning that belonged to the social and political sciences.  
 
3. Marx between Technology and Technique 
Marx is well aware of this meaning, attributed to “Technologie” by 
German cameralistic culture. In the 1861-63 Manuscripts he expli-




citly wrote about it: “Beckmann, 1772, braucht zuerst die Bezeich-
nung Technologie” [Beckmann first used the denomination of Technology].3 
This means that he was well aware of Technologie as a newly 
established discipline, whose origin dated back to the work of 
Beckmann (Anleitung zur Technologie), which Marx cites here with the 
wrong year 1772, instead of 1777. As we know from the London 
notebook of 1851, ten years earlier Marx had come into contact 
with the German technologists, with Beckmann’s Beyträge zur 
Geschichte der Erfindungen,4 with the Geschichte der Technologie of J. H. 
M. Poppe, a pupil of Beckmann, and with other works by Poppe 
himself. Previously Marx had approached the study of the labour 
process in the manufacturing and modern factory system through 
the works of A. Ure, C. Babbage and W. Schulz. With the extracts 
of 1851 he widened his gaze to the history of techniques before the 
industrial revolution. So testifies his letter to Engels of October 13, 
1851: “just recently I have been slogging away in the library I use, 
reading above all about technology and its history, and about 
agronomy, to get at least some idea of this rubbish”.5 We also know 
from another letter to Engels of January 28, 1863 that later, 
precisely during the writing of the 1861-63 manuscript, he felt the 
need to return to his technology extracts. 
 
I am inserting certain things into the section on machinery. There are some 
curious questions which I originally failed to do with. To elucidate these, I have 
re-read all my note-books (extracts) on technology and am attending a practical 
(only experimental) course for workers on the same by Prof. Willis (in Jermyn 
Street; the Institute of Geology, where Huxley also gave his lectures).6  
 
In my opinion it is precisely with the 1861-63 Manuscripts that 
Marx starts making a distinction of meaning between the term 
Technologie and the term Technik, to which I would like to draw 
attention, starting from the very explicit definition of Technologie that 
Marx gives with the first edition of the first book of Capital in 1867. 
 
The principle of large industry to resolve in its constitutive elements each 
production process, considered in and of itself and without taking man's hand 
 
3 K. Marx, Manuskript 1861-1863, MEGA, II, 3.6, p. 1932.  
4 [English translation A History of Inventions, Discoveries, and Origins, Bohn, London, 1846; 
modern reprints by Kessinger , Whitefish (MT), 2010, and HardPress, Sligo 2012 – ed. note.] 
5 Marx-Engels, Collected Works, 38: 476. 
6 Marx-Engels, Collected Works, 41: 449; in English also in Marx-Engels (1983), Letters on Capital, 
trans. A. Drummond, London, New Park, p. 82. 




into account, has created the most modern science of technology. The multi-
colored configurations of the social production process apparently devoid of 
reciprocal and stereotypical connection, broke down into applications of the 
natural sciences, consciously planned and systematically distributed according 
to the useful effect that was intended. Technology has also discovered the few 
great fundamental forms of movement in which every production action of the 
human body is carried out by necessity, despite the multiplicity of the tools 
used: just like mechanics that in machines there is a constant reproduction of 
elementary mechanical powers, and he cannot be fooled by the maximum 
complication of the machinery.7  
 
  In this definition it seems to me that Marx welcomes the basic 
inspiration of the cameralistic Technologie as objective knowledge of 
the production processes, borrowed from the precision and 
objectivity of the natural sciences. In this objectivistic reduction of 
Technologie there is no space or relevance for any autonomous 
agency of human action.  
But at the same time Marx extends the meaning of Technologie, or 
to put it better, concentrates it on a production process also 
understood as a work process, the size of which had remained 
extraneous to German technologists. Technologie for Marx does not 
only concern, as he will say in other places, “the application of 
machinery, and in general the transformation of production 
processes into the conscious application of natural science, 
mechanics, chemistry etc., for certain purposes (die Anwendung der 
Maschinerie, und überhaupt die Verwandlung der Productionsprocsses in 
bewußte Anwendung der Naturwissenschaft, Mechanik, Chemie etc., für 
bestimmte Zwecke)”.8 Technologie, then, is not only knowledge related to 
innovation made up of machines, i.e. knowledge of the way in 
which science enters directly into the production process, but it is 
also, at the same time, study and knowledge, in its naturalistic-
objectivistic perspective, of the movements of the workforce. In 
other words, for Marx, the machine is intended simultaneously as a specific form 
of use of the workforce. Furthermore Technologie is precisely the new 
science which, while dealing with the introduction of machines, 
takes as object of its knowledge the use of the workforce as an 
objective and impersonal performance. 
 
7 K. Marx, Capital, vol. I, Collected Works, 35: 489. [For Moore and Aveling’s original 1887 
translation, see Capital Vol. 1, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1967, p. 486 – ed. note.] 
8 K. Marx, Ökonomische Manuskripte 1863-1867, MEGA, II, 4, 1: 95 (my translation). 




Modern Technology in the first volume of Capital is therefore 
intrinsically connected with the concept of abstract labour, as the 
capitalist use and disposition of the labour force in the modern 
factory system. It is the science of the machine-force-labour system, 
in which the latter is itself machine activity, from which every 
possible element of subjectivity and intentionality is absent.   
But it is precisely the 1861-63 Manuscripts that is the text in which 
Marx first came to a theorization on the machinery that allowed 
him to confirm what he had already intuited in drafting the 
Grundrisse: namely that the original reality of abstract work, as 
substance of value, is placed not in the sphere of exchange and 
circulation but in that of the labour process as capitalist use of 
labour-power within the machinery system.  
At the centre of the initial page of notebook XIX Marx wrote 
«Theilung der Arbeit und mechanisches Atelier, Werkzeug und Maschinerie», 
to carry out from there a long discussion that occupies the whole of 
Notebook XIX and the first ten pages of Notebook XX. The central 
question is that of the metamorphosis of the tool in the machine 
and the transition from craftsmanship as a determining factor of 
production to work as a subordinate and marginal factor with 
respect to the productive force of science. The machine, on this 
Marx is very clear, does not arise from the division of labour and 
the breakdown of labour operations. This was in fact the path that 
Adam Smith had followed, writing in the Wealth of Nations:  
 
I shall only observe, therefore, that the invention of all those machines by 
which labour is so much facilitated and abridged, seems to have been originally 
owing to the division of labour. Men are much more likely to discover easier 
and readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their 
minds is directed towards that single object, than when it is dissipated among a 
great variety of things.9 
 
Instead for Marx, the introduction of the machinery interrupts all 
historical continuity with the centrality of an anthropomorphic prin-
ciple in production in favor of a production process that is auto-
nomous from the knowledge and centrality of the human being. 
Already in the Grundrisse he had written that the machine was 
born from the specialization of the instruments and their synthesis 
 
9 A. Smith, An inquiry into the nature and cause of the wealth of nations, Elecbook Classics: 23-24. 
[Printed version, cf. Ibid., London, Ward, Lock and Tyler, 1910, Ch. 1, p. 23 – ed- note.] 




in an automatism that autonomized itself, through science, from the 
shape and limits of the human body. The theory of formal 
subsumption and of real subsumption, that Marx has already 
developed here, is based precisely on this autonomization of 
knowledge deposited in the machine by the knowledge and doing 
of the craftsman who in manufacture was one with his instrument. 
The autonomization (differentiation) of the system of machines 
from the human body implies the radical transformation of the 
knowledge involved in the production process. We move from the 
competence and experience of the “partial worker”, i.e. of the 
Teilarbeiter of manufacturing, to the sciences of nature transformed 
into the materiality of the means of labour. As a consequence of 
this overcoming of the limits of the human body it is impossible to 
deduce the introduction the machine system moving from the 
manufacturing division of labour.  
 
It is altogether erroneous to suppose that modern machinery originally 
appropriated those operations alone, which division of labour had simplified. 
Spinning and weaving were, during the manufacturing period, split up into new 
species, and the implements were modified and improved; but the labour itself 
was in no way divided, and it retained its handicraft character. It is not the 
labour, but the instrument of labour, that serves as the starting-point of the 
machine.10  
 
For Marx “this subjective principle of the division of labour no 
longer exists in production by machinery”11 and this disappearance 
of subjectivity means that work in the new factory system becomes 
abstract work, no longer highly individualized and particularized 
work like that of the Teilarbeiter of Manufacture, but work reduced  
 
to a purely barren abstraction – a simple property which appears in 
unvarying monotony in the same operation and for which the total production 
capacity of the worker, the manifoldness of his abilities, is confiscated.12 
 
Application of the natural sciences to production through the 
creation of the machinery and transformation of the virtuous and 
very particular work of the Teilarbeiter into abstract work: these are 
the two deeply connected characteristics for Marx of the factory as 
 
10 K. Marx, Capital, vol. I, Collected Works, 35: 381n. [1967 London edition, cit., p. 378, n.] 
11 Ivi, 382. (1967 London edition, cit., p. 380)  
12 K. Marx, MEGA II, 3/1, p.252 (1861-1863 Manuscripts). [English trans. in R. Beamish Marx, 
Method and the Division of Labor, Urbana and Chicago, University of Illinois Press 1992, p. 109]. 




a new production system and as a specific object of the new science 
of Technologie. 
With respect to this meaning of Technologie, it should be 
emphasized that Marx rarely uses the term Technik in Capital and in 
the preparatory manuscripts, while he uses the adjective technique 
that derives from it more frequently. I think that the term Technik in 
the Marxian lexicon refers to a much less structured and much less 
historically determined context of meaning. It means the ability of 
homo faber, in general, throughout the history of its species, to 
intervene on the work object through means and procedures 
appropriate to the peculiar characteristics of the work object. That 
is the term Technik refers to a production process seen from the 
anthropological perspective of the worker-producers and their 
skills, acquired through apprenticeship and generational 
transmission over time, in order, through tools and means of work, 
to make useful an initially useless work material.  
In this view in Marx’s texts of Capital, the term “Technik” gener-
ally has two meanings: it means, more frequently, either the set of 
means of production, that is, the physical set of tools or machinery for 
working objects of work, or, with fewer occurrences, the proced-
ures, the skills of an art, that is, the systems of action of an actor 
oriented towards a productive end. It is a meaning that in both cases 
refers to the degree of development of the productive forces, in 
their relationship with nature and work materials, without consider-
ing the social relations between the means of work and the workforce.  
Think of Marx’s concepts of technische Basis, technische Unterlage, 
technische Grundlage or their synonym as technische Bedingung or, again, 
technical progress. Think also of the category of the “technical 
composition of capital” [technische Zusammensetzung], where the 
relationship between the means of production and the workforce is 
only physical, quantitative, and does not refer to the qualitative 
nature of the relationship.  
In short, even if the occurrences of the terms Technologie and 
Technik in Marxian texts are not always distinguished precisely, I 
believe that it can be said that the two concepts are used by Marx 
with reference to the action of two different social actors: Technik 
refers to the history of the tools and means of work created and 
accumulated by man, as a characteristic of the human species, in its 
diversity from other living species, to know how to confront and 




work nature (development and accumulation of productive forces 
over time), while Technology refers to a production system through 
machines created by science and at the same time under the control 
and direction of those who through the monopoly of science 
organize the specifically capitalist production process, in which the 
producers are themselves, like nature, made the object and 
subordinate elements of the work process. 
Based on this diversity of meanings between Technik and 
Technologie it is legitimate, in my opinion, to theorize an expansion 
of the concept of fetishism, even if this formulation is not explicitly 
stated in Marx’s text. Fetishism is not only the one explicitly 
theorized by Marx in the first book. It is not just that of the 
“commodities” that move autonomously themselves, of their own 
life, like fetishes. But it is also the fetishism proper to capital, when the 
meaning of Technik overlaps that of Technologie, making every 
dimension of domination and authoritarianism, every asymmetrical 
relationship and power between human beings disappear from the 
representation of the production system.  
Fetishism means reification, concealment and dissimulation of 
the relationships between human beings in the body of things. 
Here, more as capital fetishism then commodity fetishism, it means a 
process of capital enhancement that disappears in the face of the 
objectivity of the work process: it means a process of social 
relationships, based on inequality and exploitation, that takes the 
form of a process marked by the objectivity and truth of science 
and, specifically today, by the creativity and intelligence of the new 
knowledge-worker. 
We must not forget that the doctrine of fetishism in Marx’s work 
is connected with a profound transformation of the concept of 
“ideology”. With the Marxian theory of fetishism in Capital, ideology 
becomes intrinsic to the economic process. It is generated by the 
economic structure itself. It is no longer false consciousness, 
implemented by the abstract and fallacious thinking of philosophers 
and ideologists. Nor is ideology the production of ideas and images 
of the world that takes place within the superstructure, according to 
the indication of the 1859 Preface. In Capital, ideology is the 
representative counterfeiting that the economic structure produces 
by itself, objectively, without the intervention, if not only acquisitive 
and passive, of human consciousness. 




4. “Information” against “knowledge”: the last ideology. 
It is through this thesis of a structural fetishism, intrinsic to the 
production process, and today to be reread as the exchange 
between Technologie and Technik, that we can arrive at a critical 
analysis of the enormous transformation that we are experiencing 
today with the new information technologies applied to the 
production of capital. In other words, we can analyze the enormous 
mystification that happens through a surface of technical staging that 
hides the deeper technologies relationships of exploitation. 
From this point of view I believe that, in the world of post-
Fordism, the most widespread contemporary ideology is that of 
seeing new technologies as linked to the development of an 
intelligence and knowledge, both individual and collective, ever 
wider and always freer from slavery and repetition of Fordist 
manual work. The new ideology concerns the new information 
technologies conceived as techniques capable of putting an end to 
the anthropological era of labour as effort and initiating the new 
historical era of a work based on knowledge, and therefore 
characterized by the enhancement of the most creative and logical-
discursive faculties of the human mind. It is the ideology of the easy 
establishment, through the fielding of new mental work with 
computer machines, of a collective subjectivity which, freed from 
the differences and heaviness of bodies, works an essentially 
common alpha-numeric language. 
  In my opinion, the core of this new ideology, linked to new 
technologies, consists in confusing human knowledge with the 
transmission and processing of information. It is, namely, an ideology 
which confuses the construction of knowledge as interpretation, as 
solving problems and clarifying with meanings the intricate and 
troubled spheres of life, with the communication and calculation of 
information through automatic procedures by systems of signs. 
In order to better explain the difference between knowledge and 
information that I intend to propose to your attention, it is very 
useful, in my opinion, to refer to the conception of the cognitive 
process theorized in Spinoza’s Ethics. In the second book of his 
more important work Spinoza writes:  
 
The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other 
words a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else» 
(Spinoza, Ethics, II, prop. XIII).  





And he adds in proposition XXIII:  
 
The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of 
the modifications of the body.  
   
This means that for Spinoza the human mind first thinks of its own 
body, assumes it as a privileged object and content. But the Jewish-
Dutch thinker also emphasizes that the body itself is an individual 
formed by many individuals: 
 
The human body is composed of a number of individual parts, of diverse 
nature, each one of which is in itself extremely complex (Ethics, II, Prop. XIII, 
postulate I).  
 
The human body is a “society” made up of many parts and 
functions. The human mind takes care of this manifold organism 
by ensuring with its thought activity, as far as possible, to feed the 
plurality of the body with a variegated multiplicity of sources of 
energy and life present in the external world. The truth of 
knowledge, of the activity of the mind, lies in the degree of intensity 
that manages to ensure the body’s effort to maintain itself and to 
develop its life force, and it also lies in the degree of vital 
solicitation that is able to assure for all the components of his body. 
As is known, Spinoza defines the condition of maximum intensity 
of life of the body with the Latin term: laetitia. While defining the 
opposite condition of low vital activity of the various components 
of the body: tristitia. All this leads us to say that in Spinoza the logical 
value of knowing depends on the biological value of the «conatus». 
The maintenance and reproduction of the body organism, with the 
emotional feeling that accompanies  them, is therefore the place of 
the origin of meaning: origin of the value, what distinguishes good from 
evil, laetitia from tristitia.  
In this perspective the act of knowing (from language to the 
highest conceptual functions), is the activity of the mind that does 
not create meaning, but safeguards it, protects it and brings it to light: 
because it is able to bind the internal world of the body with the 
external world, allowing the body to practise the full set of 
relationships best suited to its life needs. 




For all this Spinoza’s Ethics looms large in the history of modern 
philosophy, because it has profoundly connected body paths and 
thought paths, and because he was the first in the history of Western 
culture to propose a materialistic-corporeal conception of the distinction 
between good and evil. According to Spinoza, in fact, that fundamental 
distinction does not arise from knowing but from feeling.  
An intellectualistic ethic presupposes that good and evil are 
external objects, belonging to a tradition or an objective structure 
of reality. Whereas the Ethics of Spinoza considers good what 
increases the power of life of the emotional body of the human 
being and produces the feeling of “laetitia”: whereas it considers evil 
what diminishes and saddens that same power of life, generating 
the feeling of “tristitia”. This kind of passage from an intellectualistic 
ethics of knowledge to a materialistic ethics of feeling is still fundamental 
today, in my opinion, to understand the depth of the 
interpenetration of mind and body in human experience and to 
understand how much emotions, instead of abstract reason, can be 
a source of knowledge.  
Over the past few decades, contemporary psychologists, 
psychoanalysts and neurobiologists have referred to this conception 
of Spinoza. Some of them have developed a so-called “two-axis 
anthropology”, according to which the existence of the human 
being must be conceived as the organization of two constitutive 
axes. On the one hand the vertical axis, as the structure of all 
possible relationships between mind and body, between thought 
and emotional dynamics and on the other the horizontal axis as the 
structure of all possible relationships between that body / mind and 
the other external minds or external environment. 
The nature of these two axes is deeply heterogeneous. Their 
characteristics, their way of proceeding, are different. Nevertheless 
according to these scholars it is fundamental to focus on their inter-
twining, following Spinoza’s lesson, to access a deeply materialistic 
conception of life and in particular of human knowledge. The 
basic thesis of these scholars is in fact that the more the mind 
expands its external field and horizon of knowledge, the more it 
accesses a rich and deep drive dynamic on the vertical plane, and 
vice versa. 
In biological terms this means that knowledge of the external 
world finds its original meaning in the way in which the unity of a 




biological-emotional organism, such as the human body, pre-intents 
the environment, anticipating and promoting the purpose of its 
reproduction. Therefore even the most abstract and elaborate 
human knowledge finds its original and remote but no less present 
meaning (without falling into easy reductionisms) in the body-
emotional system. It is always an organism, as a unity, that acts and 
moves, that attributes meaning to an incoming signal or 
perturbation. 
But the peculiarity of the human brain is that of being able to fix, 
through abstraction and generalization, invariants, general concepts 
or general modalities of meaning and behaviour that can be used 
not only once, in a single context, but several times, by several 
people, in different and variable contexts. These invariants of 
knowledge, these formations of universal and generalized use, 
constitute information properly so called, the codification of which 
allows the accumulation and transmission of any fundamental 
cultural heritage for the reproduction of individual societies as for 
the history of humanity as a whole. 
As is evident the choice and type of identification and 
communication of information codes – what signs to use, what the 
rules of their combination, what their grammars and syntax are – 
has profoundly marked the evolution of human history. In this 
sense we must recognize, that the greatest transformations in the 
history of human civilization have always been accompanied by 
profound revolutions in terms of the techniques of 
communication. In a very schematic way, it can be indeed 
summarized, as follows: 
1. The invention of the alphabet made it possible to synthesize 
the entire field of communication, both oral and written, in just 
25/30 signs, allowing humanity to get out of an iconographic com-
munication, the use of which remained in the hands of few. In this 
way the alphabet represented the fundamental means of passage 
from a society based on an aristocratic-priestly culture to a society 
of culture potentially accessible to great masses of the population.  
2. Many centuries later the other major step in the field of 
communication technique was certainly represented by the 
invention of printing and the abandonment of the amanuensis 
technique, with the enormous diffusion of the book and the written 
document that followed.  




3. Today we are undoubtedly experiencing the third great 
revolution with computers, capable of transmitting and processing 
an enormous quantity of signs condensed in a small silicon unit13.  
 
5. The world as a «massive information process» 
However we must not forget what level of abstraction has been 
reached today by the mathematical coding that underlies the 
different computer languages. The modern invention of machines 
for transmission and processing of information, independently of 
meaning, as strings of dots and lines in Morse alphabet, 0s and 1s in 
today’s computers, has fully detached information from any 
concrete and empirical meaning. The enormous power to accumulate, 
process and transmit information today is founded on the possibility of 
translating the alphabetical code into numerical-mathematical code and in turn 
of translating the numerical-mathematical code into electronic signs, into energy 
differentials. In this way the transmission and elaboration of 
information has become a mathematical science and information 
could be formally analyzed, elaborated and transmitted, independ-
ently of any interpretation. 
The revolution of new technologies offers today, but even more 
in the future, an enormous possibility that the mankind may enter 
into communication with itself, reach a self-awareness of itself, 
precisely through the enormous ability to store and process 
information. However we must not forget that this enormous 
acceleration of information processing is based on a logic of 
moving signs according to formal rules prescribing how to write 
and re-write them. At the heart of computability, of computational 
approaches of the notion of information, lies the powerful 
promotion of meaningless formalismus as information carriers. 
In the context of this technological revolution, contemporary 
ideology consists, as I have said, in seeing the world as «a massive 
information process», in which human intelligence itself is 
considered as a computational machine that processes information 
and which can be replaced by artificial intelligence, through 
machines which can process a huge amount of signs. 
 On the contrary I believe that it is necessary to maintain the 
profound difference between “sign” and “symbol”, with the 
 
13 On this topic see the excellent book by Clarisse Herrenschmidt, Le trois écritures: langue, 
nombre, code, Gallimard, Paris 2007.  




distinction between syntax and semantics that this entails. In fact, a 
system of signs follows the formal rules of connection /disjunction, 
which constitute its grammar, for example those of a binary code 
with their respect for the principle of non-contradiction. These 
formal rules of movement of the signs are in fact “formal”, because 
they form a syntax that is independent of meaning. Indeed alphabetical 
signs and numbers do not exist in nature. On the contrary the symbol, 
from the perspective of the human sciences, is a sign that refers to a 
meaning, to a semantics, which actually directs our life, separating 
the good from the evil, and thus building intentions and the 
prospects of our agency in the world.14 
I would say that the meaning of the signs as symbols is therefore 
what constitutes the content, not reducible to the language of our life, not 
reducible to any code, and which has its roots in the body of our 
memory and our feelings. Because it is by our memory and our 
feelings that we gradually build the perspectives, according to which 
we give organization and form to the world we are living in: 
precisely through an emotional memory that selects the important 
invariants in our experience and discards what is outside our vital 
interest.  
This means, in a materialistic perspective, that knowledge is 
generated in the human being only when knowledge is deeply 
connected with feeling: a complex of feelings that give meaning to 
and direct our exchange, our “agency”, with respect to our 
biological and social environment. In the human being there is an 
indispensability of the body, physical and emotional, in building 
meaningful knowledge. As Giuseppe Longo states, the human 
brain, like the animal brain, forms information in the sense of 
knowledge through a way that is completely different from the way 
in which that same information will then be processed and 
formalized in the binary languages of the digital computer.15 
 
14 The deeper reflections on this topic can be found, in my opinion, in G. Longo, Information at 
the Threshold of Interpretation Science as Human Construction of Sense, in A Critical Reflection on 
Automated Science - Will Science Remain Human?, Bertolaso M. and Sterpetti F. (eds), Cham (CH), 
Springer 2020, pp. 67-100. For a more in-depth knowledge of Giuseppe Longo’s extensive 
work see: http://www.di.ens.fr/users/longo.  
15 G. Longo, Information at the Threshold of Interpretation Science as Human Construction of Sense, 
particularly p. 87 and following. But see also by the same author, Quantifying the World and its 
Webs: Mathematical Discrete vs Continua in Knowledge Construction, 
https://www.di.ens.fr/users/longo/files//letter-to-Turing.pdf. 
DOI:10.1177/0263276419840414. 




But against a materialistic vision of the human being, based on 
the interaction of the two axes, vertical and horizontal, the 
exchange of knowledge with information and with computational 
approaches to information, an identity of human subjectivity is 
developing built only on a horizontal axis of identity and relation-
ship, to the detriment of the development of the vertical axis. 
This anthropology of the horizontal, due to the removal of the vertical 
dimension, makes impossible any critical distance from which 
individual and collective life processes can be evaluated and 
directed. It represents in fact the diffusion over the entire social 
body of a managerial behaviour, as a way of acting in a world 
connected, organized through the network, in a horizontal-
rhizomatic world, where the primary competence consists in the 
ability to enter into relationship and to build bonds. 
  It is the production of a horizontal mind, as a typology of diffuse and 
mass mind, which therefore today is on the agenda as a 
fundamental anthropological function for the production and 
valorization of capital. 
The myth of contemporary society of being a society of 
knowledge and creative participation of all in the world understood 
as a massive information process is central to this process. 
This ideology, based on the exchange between knowledge and 
information, once again plays the appearance and surface of a 
concrete work that hides the reality of an abstract work. 
It is said that new information technologies need increasingly 
communicative work performance and therefore a subject capable 
of interacting with his working environment through all his 
intelligence and mental skills, his autonomous ability to choose. 
According to this vision, in the flexible economy of post-Fordism 
the contexts of production and the market, because of the network 
organization that characterizes them, are increasingly complex and 
differentiated. In relation to this it is necessary to make full use of 
the complexity and elasticity of the human mind. Therefore today 
we need a performance with strong subjective participation and a 
degree of individualization that would refute the Marxian discourse 
on abstract labour, which can now only refer to the past for 
nineteenth-century and twentieth-century capitalism. According to 
this vision, with post-Fordist and post-industrial society, the 
effectiveness of work and concrete knowledge, the need for 




personalized intervention, with respect to standardized models of 
behaviour, would have been extended to a very large extent. 
In my opinion the verisimilitude of this discourse reflects only a 
surface reality, which in hindsight should be reversed. It seems to 
me that today it is the alpha-numeric language of computer 
machines that, with its binary codes – that is, codes that are simple 
and highly formalized – commands human intelligence. It is the 
computer language deposited in data processing programs that 
requires an environment that is already simplified and capable of 
being processed by the computer, which requires an environment 
with a very low degree of unpredictability. Nor is it a coincidence 
that the most efficient artificial intelligence systems are those that 
operate within very simplified work environments and are 
homologated to the limits of their calculation procedures. 
I mean, in short, that the problem of new technologies today is 
not so much that they, in the near future, would put an end to 
human work, with the threat of integrally replacing the human mind 
with automation and artificial intelligence. It is instead that of a 
reduction/conformation of the world-environment, including 
workers of the mind, according to parameters mainly of 
simplification and quantitative measurement, suitable for 
constituting the massive information process database. The real 
problem is that of a superficialization of the world reduced to 
measurement fields and only quantitative evaluation, which exclude 
value-oriented criteria and parameters. That is, to use Max Weber's 
sociological language, criteria that are valid for acting, determined 
for purpose and not for value-oriented action, able to discuss, 
compare and choose between purposes. 
In fact, the intelligence required by information technologies is 
an intelligence that can certainly operate and choose between 
several variables, but using programs that already in some way 
predetermine and force the field of possible answers. That is to say 
that the field of action of the intellectual worker can be 
incomparably more varied and polysemic than that of the ancient 
manual worker, but at the same time that same field is structured 
according to syntax and work sheets which, however many, refer to 
a semantics, a choice that is articulable and innovative meanings 
and aims within a given horizon. Even in this sense of a historically 




given and unachievable horizon we can say that flexible and global 
capitalism increasingly needs a horizontal mind.  
In conclusion I believe that it can be affirmed that if in Fordism 
the Maschinerei-Arbeitskraft system required the use of a mindless body, 
today the post-Fordist capitalist economy, in its most advanced 
places of development, requires a mind without a body. A mind that 
must be anaffective and decorporated and in which there is 
knowledge without self-recognition: that is acquisition and processing of 
information without recognition of the meaning and emotional 
value (and therefore of the ethical-political value) of their contents.  
For this reason, the social and cultural movements, today critical 
of capitalism, cannot in my opinion avoid deepening the breadth of 
their social criticism and attempting, against the computer-
dominated knowledge society, to intertwine and strengthen, with 
each other, the critique of political economy and the critique of the libidinal 
economy. 
 
